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Abstract
Policymakers often motivate their decisions using information collected by government
agencies. While more information can help hold the government to account, it may also
give policymakers an incentive to meddle with the work of bureaucrats. This paper de-
velops a model of biased information gathering to examine how different disclosure rules
and the degree of independence of government agencies affect citizen welfare. Disclosure
rules and agency independence interact in subtle ways. We find that secrecy is never
optimal and yet insulating the agency from political pressure, so that its information
is always unbiased, may also not be socially optimal. A biased information gathering
process can benefit the government by helping it to shape public opinion. But it can
also benefit the public, by curbing the government’s tendency to implement its ex ante
favored policy, thus mitigating the agency conflict between policymakers and the public.
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Human experience teaches us that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may
well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interest to the detriment
of the decision-making process. (U.S. Supreme Court, United States v. Nixon)
We also recognize that there is a real dilemma between giving the public an authoritative
account of the intelligence picture and protecting the objectivity of the JIC [Joint Intelligence
Committee] from the pressures imposed by providing information for public debate. (Butler
Report, p. 114)
1 Introduction
Transparency is an essential feature of a democratic and accountable state and yet, despite
substantial progress in recent years, exceptions to the principle of open government remain
commonplace (Prat, 2006). In the United States, for instance, the President has the right to
withhold information from Congress and the courts, typically on the grounds that he needs
candid and confidential advice from his staff. Freedom of Information laws also frequently al-
low policymakers to withhold information, most notably to protect internal decision making,
personal privacy and national security (Banisar, 2004; Roberts, 2006).
This paper examines one important rationale for lack of transparency in government: the
concern that public dissemination of information might compromise the quality of government
decision making. We develop a model where the government receives information from an
agency about a particular policy, and then decides whether or not the policy should be
implemented. For instance, the government might receive an intelligence report about the
opportunity to go to war, or an environmental impact assessment about the opportunity to
build a new nuclear power plant. As is standard in political agency models, the preferences of
the government and the public are not perfectly aligned. The government is more favorable
than the public towards implementation but also wants public support for its decision. Thus,
while policymakers may be more willing to wage war than voters, they are nevertheless
responsive to public opinion.
Our key assumption is that the agency may be politicized and hence its report to the
government may be biased. If the agency is independent, then it provides an unbiased report
about the consequences of implementing the policy, and hence about the appropriate course
of action. However, if the agency is not independent, then this report may be biased in favor
of the government’s ex ante preferred decision; that is, the report may be biased in favor of
implementation. With a nonindependent agency, we assume that the government can choose
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the optimal degree of bias so as to maximize its own welfare. For instance, the government
may staff the agency with individuals who are prone to stating a case for war, seek the advice
of biased experts, or encourage biased information gathering and evaluation. The drawback
is that all parties with access to the report (including the government) then receive lower
quality information which can result in poor decision making.
We use this framework to address two questions, both from the perspective of the public.
First, should the contents of the report be publicly disclosed? And second, should the agency
be made independent of the government? Both issues are of great practical importance. It is
often claimed that secrecy is instrumental in protecting the integrity of the decision-making
process and indeed one of the most common exemptions to the principle of open government
concerns pre-decision information (Banisar, 2004). Granting independence to government
agencies is also becoming increasingly common. The Federal Trade Commission in the U.S.
and the Bank of England, for instance, have a status that ensures their independence from
political pressure by limiting the removal of their heads to certain specific causes. The British
commission in charge of investigating recent episodes of intelligence failure also recommended
to strengthen the independence of the Joint Intelligence Committee, although it fell well short
of recommending full independence from the executive (Butler Report, 2004, pp. 143-144).
In line with conventional wisdom, we find that disclosure (‘transparency’) makes the gov-
ernment more accountable and hence more responsive to public desires, relative to nondis-
closure (‘secrecy’). However, disclosure also induces policymakers to distort the process of
information gathering and evaluation. In contrast, when no information can be disclosed,
the government has no incentive to manipulate information. Secrecy is therefore effective at
protecting the integrity of the decision-making process.
We also consider a constitutional stage in which both the disclosure rule and the agency’s
degree of independence can be specified. The most surprising results emerge regarding what
rule and degree of independence maximize the public’s welfare. We show that from the pub-
lic’s perspective, secrecy is never optimal, but it can be optimal for the government agency
not to be independent. Secrecy is always dominated by transparency because its chief advan-
tage – unbiased information – can be more efficiently obtained by insulating the agency from
political pressure. And yet the public may sometimes prefer that the agency be politicized
so that its report is potentially biased. The government may opt for a biased agency that
tends to submit favorable reports, because these reports help shape public opinion. However,
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for any given decision rule, biased information increases the probability that the government
will make the wrong decision, which hurts both itself and the public. The government wants
to avoid making the wrong decision and so taylors its optimal decision rule to the agency’s
level of bias. We show that a pro-implementation bias in information has a moderating ef-
fect; for given evidence, it makes the government more reluctant to implement the policy.
This moderating effect benefits the public, which views implementation less favorably than
the government. Thus, manipulation of information can help mitigate the agency conflict
between the government and the public.
From a theoretical perspective, this result can be seen as an application of the theory of
the second-best. According to this theory, introducing a new inefficiency – manipulation of
information – in an environment where another inefficiency is already present – the agency
conflict between the government and the public – can sometimes increase social welfare.
Previous work has examined how politicians can be held accountable when voters are not
perfectly informed. Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) and Maskin and Tirole (2004) study models
where policymakers have private information and reelection concerns create incentives for
pandering. However, because these models do not allow policymakers to credibly communi-
cate their private information to voters, they cannot distinguish between transparency and
secrecy. Subsequent research has relaxed the assumption that voters are imperfectly informed
by examining the role of media. Besley and Prat (2006) develop a model where incumbents
(good and bad) can manipulate media reports by offering some form of compensation to
the media owners. Their analysis focuses on how features of the media industry affect the
quality of the media reports and political turnover. Ashworth and Shotts (2010) find that
a government can have lower incentives to pander when the media has a tendency to act
as a “yes-man” (thus herding on the incumbent’s choice) because negative media reports
then become strongly indicative of an incorrect policy choice. Warren (2012) focuses on the
motivations of news-media providers. He shows that a moderate degree of pro-incumbent
bias helps improve government accountability because, if in equilibrium even bad incumbents
act in the public interest, then journalists that exert investigative effort will tend to uncover
positive information about the incumbents. As a consequence, a pro-incumbent bias gives
journalists an extra incentive to work hard.
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There are several important differences between the present paper, Ashworth and Shotts
(2010), and Warren (2012). In our model, information is collected by an agency and commu-
nicated to the government before a decision is taken; moreover, the quality of the information
gathering-process can be affected by the government. In Ashworth and Shotts (2010) and
Warren (2012), the role of news-media providers is simply to verify ex post what information
the government had when the decision was taken. These papers provide valuable insights
into the motivations and behavior of the media.1 However, they do not address the issue
of how to protect the quality of government information. They also do not examine ques-
tions of institutional design such as the choice between transparency and secrecy or between
independent and nonindependent bureaucrats.
One important similarity between our work, Ashworth and Shotts (2010), and Warren
(2012), is that in all three settings, some degree of pro-incumbent bias can improve social
welfare. However, the mechanism driving this result is completely different in each set-
ting. In Ashworth and Shotts (2010), the rational tendency of news-media providers to
herd on the incumbent’s choice makes negative reports more informative. In Warren (2012),
a pro-incumbent bias strengthen news-media providers’ incentives. In our model, biased
information has a moderating influence on government policy and can more closely align
policymakers’ and citizens’ preferences. These papers are thus best seen as complements.
The present paper is also related to the literature on transparency in principal-agent rela-
tionships (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Cremer, 1995; Stasavage 2004). Prat (2005), in particular,
develops a model of career concerns for experts where the principal can observe the agent’s
action and/or its consequences. He shows that transparency on action can induce the agent
to disregard useful private information and act in a conformist manner. As a consequence,
the principal can be better off by committing not to observe the action. Transparency on
consequences, by contrast, always benefits the principal. Fox (2007) develops a related model
where the concern for policymakers is not to prove that they are competent, but to show that
they are unbiased. The present paper differs from these articles because it focuses neither
on transparency on action nor on consequences. We measure transparency by the extent to
which pre-decision information is shared between the agent and the principal. Our focus is
1For theoretical analyses of bureaucratic behavior, see also Prendergast (1993, 2007), Gailmard and Patty
(2007), Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008), Patty (2009), Shotts and Wiseman (2010) and Ujhelyi (2014).
Our analysis leaves the motivations of agency bureaucrats in the background, allowing us to focus on how
disclosure rules and public opinion can shape policy. Interactions between politicians, bureaucrats and voters
are explored in Fox and Jordan (2011).
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not whether transparency induces conformism on the part of the agent, but whether an agent
will distort his own information (and possibly the principal’s) to influence how the principal
perceives his action.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
model. Sections 3 and 4 study different disclosure rules (transparency and secrecy), under
the assumption that the government agency is nonindependent. Section 5 considers the case
of an independent agency and compares different institutional arrangements from the public’s
point of view. Extensions are discussed in Section 6, while Section 7 concludes. Proofs are
gathered in two technical appendices.
2 Model
We consider a model of government decision making where (i) the government is responsive
to public opinion and (ii) the agency that provides the government with information is
potentially biased. The model has four stages. At stage 1, if the agency is nonindependent,
then the government chooses the agency’s level of bias, q ∈ [0, 1]. One can interpret q as the
type of bureaucrats who work at the agency. In contrast, if the agency is independent, its bias
is equal to zero (q ≡ 0). At stage 2, the agency produces a report for the government. This
report may or may not be publicly revealed, depending on the disclosure rule, as discussed
below. At stage 3, the government and the public sequentially take actions. First, the
government must choose whether to implement a new policy (p = a) or stick with the status
quo (p = n). If the government decides to implement the new policy, then the public can
protest (v = d) or accept (v = nd) implementation. The cost to the public of protesting is
c ≥ 0; the benefit is that implementation fails with probability p, in which case the policy
reverts to the status quo. Thus p ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of the power of public opinion at
constraining government action. When p is close to 1, the public can almost always block
the implementation of the new policy. If the government selects the status quo, we assume
that the public does not protest, and that the status quo remains.3 At stage 4, payoffs are
2Levy (2007) and Swank et al. (2008) develop models closely related to Prat’s to study the effect of
transparency on committee decision making. They show that secrecy can be conducive to better decision
making because, if individual votes cannot be observed, then voters have less of an incentive to distort their
actions in order to signal their types.
3This assumption is without loss of generality, because the government is biased in favor of implementation
relative to the public (see below). Even if the public could protest against the status quo, to pressure the
government to implement the new policy, it would never do so in equilibrium in our setting.
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realized.
Preferences. The payoffs of the government and the public depend on the state of the world,
S ∈ {A,N}. The public would like the policy to match the true state, a = A or n = N , in
which case its payoff is zero. The public incurs a loss of Ca if the policy is implemented and
the true state is N , and a loss of Cn if the policy is not implemented and the true state is
A. Without loss of generality, we assume that Ca + Cn = 1 and that A and N are a priori
equally likely.4
Let σP denote the public’s posterior belief that the true state is A and assume that
the government implements the new policy. The public protests if its utility from protesting,
(1−p)[−Ca (1− σP )]+p[−CnσP ]−c, is higher than its utility from accepting implementation,
−Ca (1− σP ). This condition can be rewritten as
Ca − σP > c
p
. (1)
Thus, the public protests when protesting is effective (p large), when the cost of protesting,
c, is small, when state A is believed to be unlikely (σP low) and when the cost of mistaken
implementation, Ca, is relatively high. We assume that in a pure strategy equilibrium, if the
public is indifferent, then it will accept implementation.5
The preferences of the government are not entirely congruent with those of public. Like
the public, the government also incurs a loss of Ca from implementing the policy when
the state is N , and a loss of Cn from not implementing the policy when the state is A.
However, in addition to this concern for public welfare (a ‘legacy’ concern), the government
also enjoys a private benefit B ≥ 0 when the new policy is implemented.6 Finally, the
government suffers an explicit loss L > 0 whenever the public protests against its decision.
The parameter L captures in a stylized fashion a number of costs associated with a loss of
popularity or legitimacy, such as economic disruption caused by protests, vilification by the
4Assuming that A and N are equally likely is convenient, as it simplifies expressions for the posterior
beliefs of the public and the government. Relaxing this assumption would be notationally burdensome but
would not qualitatively affect the analysis.
5When the public is uncertain about a politician’s type, fully rational Bayesian information processing
can induce the public to vote for an incumbent who is known to have chosen a suboptimal policy (from the
public’s point of view). This is because the suboptimal policy may convey information about the politician’s
type, and voters want to select the best candidate going forward (see, e.g, Daley and Snowberg, 2009; Fox and
Shotts, 2009; Ashworth, 2012). This issue does not arise in the present model, where there is no uncertainty
about government skill or policy preferences.
6We assume that the public knows the value B. This is a reasonable assumption for situations where the
government is well established and its policy preferences are widely known.
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press, or greater likelihood that the government may step down in the future. Thus, L, like
p, is a measure of how powerful public opinion is at disciplining the government.
Let σGov denote the government’s belief that S = A. Suppose that the public protests
when the government selects implementation. Then the government payoff when choosing
implementation is (1− p)[−Ca (1− σGov) + B] + p[−CnσGov]− L, while it is −CnσGov when
it chooses the status quo. The government selects implementation over the status quo if
−Ca + σGov +B ≥ L
1− p . (2)
The government is more likely to select implementation when the public is unable to effec-
tively discipline the government (L and p low), when the private benefits from implementation
B are high, and when the cost to the public of mistaken implementation (the legacy concern)
is relatively small (σGov high and Ca low). We assume that in a pure strategy equilibrium, if
the government is indifferent, then it will select implementation. In the analysis that follows,
we define
E ≡ L
1− p. (3)
This parameter captures the strength of public pressure at constraining the government.7
Information Structure. Before making a policy decision, the government receives a report
from the agency. This report is composed of two signals, si ∈ {α,∅} , i = 1, 2. A α signal
provides evidence in support of implementation, while a ∅ signal provides evidence in support
of the status quo. If the agency is independent, then these signals are genuine, sGi . Genuine
signals are informative, conditionally independent and satisfy Pr(sGi = α|A) = Pr(sGi =
∅|N) = θ, where θ ∈ (1
2
, 1) measures the signal precision.8
If the agency is nonindependent, then the signal-generating process may be distorted.
Let sq = {sq1, sq2} be the report produced by a nonindependent agency with bias q ∈ [0, 1].
7To illustrate p > 0 and L > 0, take the 2012 Quebec student protests over provincial government plans
to increase university tuition fees. After months of sustained protest, the government was voted out of office
in September 2012, and the policy was reversed. The crisis was estimated to have cost the government $26
million for extra policing, as well as costing $33 million to the publicly-funded network of community colleges,
and $20 million to Universite´ du Que´bec a` Montre´al alone. For more details, see Chapter 3 of the exhaustive
government report, “Rapport, Commission spe´ciale d’examen des e´ve´nements du printemps 2012”, Quebec
Ministry for Public Security, March 2014, available in French at www.securitepublique.gouv.qc.ca. See also
“UQAM claims student protests cost it $20 million” by Kevin Dougherty and Michelle Lalond, Montreal
Gazette, October 30, 2012, and “Liberal government dismisses report on student unrest as a political attack”
by the Canadian Press, May 15, 2014.
8We use two signals to allow for situations where the evidence is mixed. We use binary signals (instead
of a single signal with multiple signal realizations) because this allows for a simple parametrization of the
process of information manipulation, as explained below.
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We capture the idea of asymmetric vetting by assuming that with probability q, a genuine
∅ signal is transformed into a fake α signal. That is, the nonindependent agency garbles
the signal-generating process so that Pr(sqi = α | sGi = ∅) = q, which is independent
across signals. The probability that a genuine α signal is transformed into a fake ∅ signal
is zero, Pr(sqi = ∅ | sGi = α) = 0. Thus q measures the agency’s bias in favor of the
government’s ex ante preference for implementation. A non-independent agency with zero
bias will behave just like an independent agency, and produce a report consisting of genuine
signals, s0 = sG =
{
sG1 , s
G
2
}
.
If the agency is nonindependent, we allow the government to choose q to maximize its
own payoff. This assumption is plausible if the government can appoint key agency person-
nel or can punish or reward them. We also posit that the government only observes the
biased signals sq, rather than the genuine ones. This captures the fundamental drawback of
manipulations: information is lost which may have been useful for decision making.9
Before proceeding, we introduce some additional notation. Let (·, ·)q be a shorthand for
sq = (·, ·). Any party that observes sq will update its beliefs about the true state, where we
define σq+ ≡ Pr(A|(α, α)q), σq ≡ Pr(A|(α,∅)q) = Pr(A|(∅, α)q), σ− ≡ σq− ≡ Pr(A|(∅,∅)q) =
σG−. These beliefs correspond to the three possible cases that can arise: (i) the report supports
implementation (sq = (α, α)), (ii) the report is mixed (sq = (α,∅) or (∅, α)) or (iii) the report
supports the status quo (sq = (∅,∅)).10 We sometimes refer to α signals as positive signals,
and to ∅ signals as negative signals. It is easy to verify that rational agents discount the
α signals more than the ∅ signals because the α signals can be forged: σq ≤ σG = 1
2
and
σq+ ≤ σG+. This effect becomes stronger as q grows: ∂σq/∂q < 0 and ∂σq+/∂q < 0. The belief
σ− does not depend on q, because negative signals must be genuine.
We also make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. Ca − cp ∈ (σG, σG+],
Assumption 2. Ca −B ∈ (σ−, σG+].
These assumptions imply that the information in the report is potentially decision-relevant
9Disclosure is always truthful, in the sense that a government which discloses a possibly forged report sq
has not observed the genuine signals. Moreover, the public does not explicitly penalize the government for
manipulating information, since the public is only concerned with how protest affects its own payoff.
10Simple computations yield σq+ =
θ2+q2(1−θ)2+qR
V+2qR+q2V , σ
q = (R/2)+q(1−θ)
2
R+qV and σ− =
(1−θ)2
V , where R ≡
2θ(1− θ) and V ≡ θ2 + (1− θ)2.
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for both players. Assumption 1 states that the public will protest if the government selects
implementation when the evidence is mixed, but will accept implementation following two
positive, genuine signals. Assumption 1 requires that c not be too large. If c was very large,
the public would never protest and the analysis would be uninteresting.
Assumption 2 states that, even without the disciplining effect of public opinion (E = 0),
the government prefers the status quo over implementation when both signals are negative,
and prefers implementation over the status quo when two genuine signals are positive. This
assumption ensures that the government always bears a cost for manipulating information
because there are states when it prefers the status quo.
Together, Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the government and the public always agree
when the evidence is clear cut. They both favor implementation when (α, α)G and they both
favor the status quo when (∅,∅)G. Nevertheless, disagreement can arise when the signals
are not genuine, or when genuine signals are mixed. In the latter case, the public prefers
the status quo (by Assumption 1), but the government may prefer implementation (if B is
sufficiently large). This disagreement is the source of the agency problem in our setting.
Observability of the Agency’s Bias. An important issue is whether the public can
observe the agency’s bias q. For most of the paper, we will focus on the polar opposite
scenarios of ‘transparency’ and ‘secrecy’. Under transparency, both the agency’s report and
its levels of bias are observable, while under secrecy, neither is observable. Transparency
should therefore be interpreted as an environment where information is easily accessible, not
just about the contents of the report, but also about the staffing, track record and likely bias
of the agency that drafts it. In contrast, under secrecy, information about the agency as well
as the report is tightly guarded. Focusing on transparency versus secrecy allows us to keep
the analysis tractable. Intermediate cases between transparency and secrecy are discussed in
Section 6.
3 Transparency
We assume throughout this section that all information must be truthfully disclosed and that
the agency is nonindependent. Since the government and the public both observe the signals
sq and the agency’s bias q, they will share the same posterior beliefs. Let pi(p(sq), v(sq)) denote
the government’s payoff given sq, where p(sq) denotes the policy decision of the government
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and v(sq) denotes the public’s decision whether to protest or accept implementation. Let
Pr(sq|sG) be the probability of observing sq conditional on genuine signals sG. For any given
q ∈ [0, 1], the government’s expected payoff is
E(piq) =
∑
sG∈{α,∅}2
 ∑
sq∈{α,∅}2
pi(p(sq), v(sq)|sG) Pr(sq|sG)
Pr (sG) . (4)
Equation (4) shows that manipulating information affects the government through two dis-
tinct channels. Higher levels of bias undermine the government’s ability to tailor its policy
decision p(sq) to the true state. This harms the government because its optimal decision is
state-dependent. However, changing the distribution of observed signals Pr(sq|sG) also allows
the government to shape public opinion, v(sq). This can benefit the government by helping
convince the public to accept implementation.
We begin with a preliminary result showing that the equilibrium level of bias is bounded
from above.
Lemma 1. The government will never choose a level of bias that always leads the public
to protest implementation. Formally, in equilibrium, q ∈ [0, qmax], where qmax ∈ [0, 1) solves
σq
max
+ = Ca − cp .
Because the public is rational, the weight it places on a positive report is decreasing in
the level of bias. When q > qmax, the bias is so large that the public disregards the report:
citizens protest even when both signals are positive. The government strictly prefers setting
a lower value of q ∈ [0, qmax], which provides better information for decision making and can
also generate support for implementation through a positive report.
Having bounded from above the level of bias that can be optimal, we now examine which
policy decisions are taken and supported in equilibrium. We begin with a partial result that
simplifies the government’s optimization problem. A full characterization of equilibrium play
is provided later in Proposition 1.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, the government selects implementation when both signals are
positive and the status quo when both signals are negative. The public accepts implementation
if and only if both signals are positive.
Lemma 2 easily follows from Assumptions 1 and 2 and the fact that in equilibrium q ≤
qmax. It shows that the public and the government always agree on the appropriate course
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of action when the evidence is clear-cut (i.e., when the signals are both positive or both
negative). What Lemma 2 does not show is whether the government will implement the
policy when the evidence is mixed, in spite of public protests. To distinguish between the
two relevant cases, we make the following definition.
Definition (discipline). Fix q ≤ qmax. The government is said to be disciplined by public
opinion if it selects implementation if and only if both signals are positive.
A government that is disciplined by public opinion selects the status quo when the evi-
dence is mixed, and so always enjoys public support. It always takes the public’s preferred
action and never faces protests.11 For given q ≤ qmax, let E(piqd) denote the government’s
payoff under discipline. Specifically, let E(piqd) be a special case of (4) where (i) q ≤ qmax,
(ii) the government selects implementation if and only if both signals are positive, and (iii)
the public accepts implementation if and only if both signals are positive. Note that E(piqd)
incorporates all the requirements in Lemmas 1 and 2 as well as the notion of discipline.
A government that is not disciplined by public opinion will select implementation when
the evidence is mixed, despite the public’s protests. Let E(piqnd) be the government’s payoff
in that case. Thus, E(piqnd) is a special case of (4), where (i) q ≤ qmax, (ii) the government
selects implementation if and only if the signals are positive or mixed, and (iii) the public
accepts implementation if and only if both signals are positive. Both E(piqd) and E(pi
q
nd) are
explicitly computed in Appendix A.
To simplify the exposition of the results, we rule out corner solutions that would arise
when the constraint q ≤ qmax binds. Specifically, we assume
q∗ ≡ arg max
q∈[0,1]
E(piqd) < q
max. (5)
Like Assumption 2, condition (5) requires that B not to be too large. An explicit condition
is provided in the appendix (see the proof of Proposition 1).
We can now state this section’s main result.
Proposition 1. Fix the value of p ∈ (0, 1), and let E = L/(1 − p) from (3). Then in
the equilibrium of the transparency game, the public accepts implementation if and only if
sq = (α, α). Moreover
11This is true because q ≤ qmax. If q > qmax, then the public would always protest following implementa-
tion.
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i. If B ≤ Ca− 12 , then the government selects implementation if and only if sq = (α, α) ,
and the equilibrium level of bias is zero.
ii. If B ∈ (Ca − 12 , Ca − 12 + E), then the government selects implementation if and only
if sq = (α, α) , and the equilibrium level of bias is q∗ = R
V
B−Ca+1/2
Ca−B−σ− < q
max, where
R ≡ 2θ (1− θ) and V ≡ θ2 + (1− θ)2.
iii. If B ≥ Ca − 12 + E, then there are two possible cases. In the first case, the gov-
ernment selects implementation if and only if sq = (α, α), and the level of bias is
q∗ = R
V
B−Ca+1/2
Ca−B−σ− < q
max. In the second case, the government selects implementation if
and only if sq 6= (∅,∅), and the level of bias is qL(p, E) < q∗, with qL(p, E) = 0 if
p ≤ 1/2. The second case arises if and only if E(piq∗d ) ≤ E(piq
L(p,E)
nd ).
Proposition 1 fully characterizes equilibrium play in the transparency game.12 Case (i)
deals with a situation whereB is so small that, even in the absence of protests, the government
would select the status quo when the evidence was mixed.13 The government’s interests are
aligned with those of the public, so there is no need to manipulate information.
Case (ii) deals with a situation where the government would select implementation if
E = 0 and the genuine signals were mixed, (B > Ca − 12), but where public pressure leaves
it unwilling to make an unpopular decision (B < Ca − 12 +E). There is a conflict of interest
between the government and the public, but the government still takes the public’s preferred
action so as to avoid protests.
However, precisely because public opinion is so powerful, the government now has an
incentive to shape it. Note that the government’s choice of bias affects the distribution of
the observed signals sq. This has two effects on the government’s payoff E(piqd). On the one
hand, higher levels of bias q reduce the quality of information available for decision making.
Specifically, with probability 1
2
q2V , two genuine negative signals are transformed into two
positive signals. This will result in the policy being implemented and in an expected loss for
the government of Ca − B − σ−, relative to the counterfactual where q = 0. On the other
hand, the government wants to ‘trick’ the public into supporting implementation when the
12This equilibrium is unique given our particular tie-breaking rules that specify how players behave when
indifferent. Different tie-breaking rules would only affect play in a region of parameter space (B,E) that has
zero area, specifically for parameters such that E(piq
∗
d ) = E(pi
qL(p,E)
nd ).
13This follows from equation (2) and the fact that σGov ≤ 12 when the evidence is mixed.
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genuine signals are mixed. Manipulations help the government because they can transform
mixed signals into two positive signals. This occurs with probability qR and yields a net
benefit of B − Ca + 12 to the government, relative to the counterfactual where q = 0. The
optimal q balances precisely these gains from manipulation against the costs associated with
poor decision making.14
The third case is when B ≥ Ca − 12 + E. This case is more complicated because the
government may or may not select implementation when the evidence is mixed. Condition
B ≥ Ca − 12 + E implies that in the absence of bias, q = 0, the government would select
implementation (no discipline). However, q is endogenous, and the government’s optimal
level of bias may differ from zero. The crucial observation here is that for any given signal
realization sq, the government’s incentive to select implementation is (weakly) decreasing in
q. As q becomes large, observed α signals are more likely to be fake, leaving the government
more reluctant to implement the policy. Setting a large level of bias may lead the government
to select the status quo when the evidence is mixed (discipline).
We distinguish between two cases, depending on whether the optimal q is above or below
a cutoff qˆ. The cutoff is defined so that, if q ≤ qˆ, the government selects implementation after
observing a mixed report (no discipline).15 Thus, the government payoff on [0, qˆ] is E(piqnd).
Conversely, if q > qˆ, then the government selects the status quo after observing a mixed
report (discipline). Thus, the government payoff on q ∈ (qˆ, qmax] is E(piqd).
Taken together, we obtain the following expression for the government’s payoff as a func-
tion of q when B ≥ Ca − 12 + E:
E(piqLB) ≡

E(piqnd) if q ∈ [0, qˆ]
E(piqd) if q ∈ (qˆ, qmax]
. (6)
When private benefits B are large (LB), the government will maximize E(piqLB) with respect
to q ∈ [0, qmax]. Two types of equilibria can arise: one characterized by a low bias in
information and by no discipline (when the optimal q lies on the interval [0, qˆ]), and another
characterized by a large bias in information and by discipline (when the optimal q lies on the
interval (qˆ, qmax]), as in Case (ii).
14Manipulations can also transform two negative signals into mixed signals. Under discipline, however,
this change is inconsequential because the government selects the status quo in both cases.
15Formally, qˆ is implicitly defined by σqˆ = Ca −B + E. See Appendix B for an explicit characterization.
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In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that the government’s payoff is concave over
(qˆ, qmax], and that it is convex over [0, qˆ] whenever p is below a threshold that exceeds
1/2. We give an explicit expression for the threshold in the proof of Proposition 2. This
nonconcavity leads to an optimal level of the bias of either zero or q∗ ≡ arg maxq∈[0,1]E(piqd),
as stated in Proposition 1(iii). For values of p above the threshold, the government’s payoff
is concave over [0, qˆ] as well. The equilibrium level of bias when the government chooses
no discipline may then be non-zero, qL(p, E), but it still remains below q∗, the equilibrium
bias under discipline. We can say more precisely for which parameter values the government
chooses discipline and high bias, E(piq
∗
d ) > E(pi
qL(p,E)
nd ), and for which parameter values it
chooses no discipline and low bias, E(piq
∗
d ) ≤ E(piq
L(p,E)
nd ). However, for ease of exposition, we
postpone this discussion until the following section.
Proposition 1 shows that for the most part, government behavior only depends on p and
L through the expression E = p/(1 − L). To distinguish between the different cases, what
matters is the effectiveness of the public at constraining government actions. Whether the
strength of public pressure arises primarily through the ability to block implementation (p
close to 1) or to make the government suffer a high explicit loss (L large) is unimportant.
However, the government’s optimal behavior within case (iii) will depend independently on
both p and L. Both the optimal level of bias without discipline, qL(p, E), and the condition
E(piq
∗
d ) ≤ E(piq
L(p,E)
nd ), which determines whether or not the government chooses discipline,
depend on p and L in ways other than the ratio E = p/(1 − L). Put another way, holding
fixed E at a value satisfying case (iii), the government’s behavior may differ depending on
whether p is high and L is low, or whether p is low and L is high. The next section addresses
this point in more detail.
3.1 Can the Public Benefit from Biased Information?
Proposition 1 shows that, depending on parameter values, two different equilibrium outcomes
can arise: one with no discipline and low bias (q = qL(p, E)), and another with discipline and
high bias
(
q = q∗ > qL(p, E)
)
. Moreover, under Case (iii), the government may be willing to
choose discipline precisely because it is also able to manipulate information. If the bias were
forced to be zero, so that the agency was independent, then the government would become
less cautious and select implementation when the evidence was mixed.
This subsection explores the idea that, due to the positive equilibrium association between
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bias and discipline, the government’s ability to manipulate information may benefit the
public. We begin with an illustrative example, describing the region of parameter space
(B,E) for which this is indeed the case.
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium level of discipline and bias implied by Proposition 1, as a
function of B and E, when Ca = 0.6, θ = 0.8, and c = 0, in the limit as p tends to zero. The
different values of E in the figure correspond to different values of L = (1− p)E, where p is
held fixed.
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B = Ca - 12 + E
EIUnd0 M = EIUdq
* M
B = Ca - 12
iii - No Discipline
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Bias
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Equilibrium Level of Bias and Discipline, Proposition 1
Figure 1: Equilibrium Level of Discipline and Bias, for Ca = 0.6, θ = 0.8, c = 0, limp→0
Figure 1 illustrates the regions of parameter space corresponding to the various cases of
Proposition 1. Below the horizontal line B = Ca − 1/2, Case (i) implies the government will
be disciplined by public opinion and will choose zero bias. Above this horizontal line but
below the 45 degree line B = Ca−1/2+E, Case (ii) implies the government will be disciplined
by public opinion, choose high bias q∗, and would remain disciplined even if it were forced
to set a bias of zero. Above the 45 degree line are the two subregions corresponding to Case
(iii), in a setting where the public’s ability to block implementation through protest is low:
one where the government chooses no discipline and no bias, and another where it chooses
discipline and high bias q∗.
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Figure 1 also shows that the boundary between the two subregions follows a threshold
structure. For any given B > Ca − 1/2, the government chooses no discipline and low
bias, E(piq
∗
d ) ≤ E(piq
L(p,E)
nd ), if and only if E is below a certain threshold. Intuitively, the
government’s incentive to choose discipline is increasing in the strength of public pressure,
since discipline allows it to avoid protests. For all B > Ca − 1/2, this threshold is strictly
greater than zero and strictly less than B−Ca + 1/2. This means that both subregions have
strictly positive area.
In the subregion of Case (iii) with discipline and high bias, the government’s ability to
manipulate information may benefit the public, which is the case in the shaded area. Within
this subregion, the government’s ability to manipulate information has two effects on citizen
welfare. Bias makes positive signals less reliable, so that the government selects the status
quo when the evidence is mixed. This moderating effect of bias helps the public by making
the government more cautious. However, bias also means that seemingly positive signals may
be forgeries, which hurts the public by unduly stacking the deck in favour of implementation.
The public will benefit from the government’s ability to manipulate information if the gains
from discipline generated by this moderating effect outweigh the losses due to biased decision
making. Moreover, these losses are increasing in the level of bias. Because q∗ is increasing in
B and independent of E, there is a threshold value of B below which the public is willing
to accept bias q∗ to more closely align the government’s interests with its own.16 The public
benefits from the government’s ability to manipulate information in the shaded area of Figure
1, which is the part of subregion (iii - Discipline and Bias) where q∗ is not excessively high.
More generally, as shown in Proposition 2 below, there is always a region of parameter
space (B,E) corresponding to the shaded area in Figure 1, where the public strictly benefits
from the government’s ability to manipulate information.
Proposition 2. Fix the value of p ∈ (0, 1), and let E = L/(1 − p) from (3). Then for
any Ca and any θ ∈ (12 , 1), there are values of B and E such that a commitment not to
manipulate information strictly hurts the public. Specifically, there exists B > Ca − 12 , and
E(B) < B −Ca + 12 for any B ∈ (Ca − 12 , B), such that E(U q
∗
d ) > E(U
qL(p,E)
nd ) if and only if
B ×E ∈ (Ca − 12 , B)× (E(B), B −Ca + 12 ]. The region of parameter space (B,E) for which
E(U q
∗
d ) > E(U
qL(p,E)
nd ) is increasing in size with p and c, where
∂
∂p
E(B) < 0, limp→1E(B) = 0,
16The threshold value of B is identified by E(Uq
∗
d ) = E(U
G
nd) when q
∗ < qmax holds at this threshold,
where B only affects the public’s payoff via q∗ = RV
B−Ca+1/2
Ca−B−σ− .
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and ∂
∂c
B > 0.
Proposition 2 confirms that the results from Figure 1 hold more generally. There is always
a region of parameter space for which manipulations help the public, comprising exactly those
pairs (B,E) for which B is sufficiently close to Ca − 12 , and for which E exceeds a threshold
between zero and and B −Ca + 1/2. Proposition 2 also generates a number of new insights.
First, it shows that manipulating information is more likely to help the public when there is
a relatively large cost of protesting. As long as Assumption 1 holds, forcing the bias to zero
will lead to protests, when the government implements based on evidence that is mixed. An
increase in c hurts the public in such situations. Citizens are therefore willing to accept a
higher level of bias in order to ensure the government remains disciplined by public opinion,
leading to a higher cutoff B.17
Second, and perhaps more subtly, Proposition 2 shows that manipulating information
is more likely to help citizens when public pressure arises mainly from potentially blocking
implementation (p large and L small), rather than imposing a high explicit loss on the
government (L large and p small). Figure 1, where p is small and c = 0, therefore understates
the size of parameter space where manipulations help the public. The intuition is that the
government’s payoff from choosing discipline is independent of p and L, since the public never
protests. In contrast, the government’s payoff from no discipline is decreasing in p, holding
E = L/(1− p) constant. A government choosing no discipline is willing to suffer the explicit
loss due to protest in order to implement the new policy when the evidence is mixed. On the
margin, increasing the public’s ability to block implementation then hurts the government
to a large extent, outweighing the drop in the explicit loss from protest.
It follows that an increase in p and drop in L, holding E constant, leads the government
to choose discipline and high bias q∗ in a larger region of parameter space. Redrawing Figure
1 with p fixed at a higher value would therefore yield a larger shaded region, where the
ability to manipulate helps the public. In the limit as p tends to 1 and L tends to zero, the
cutoff E(B) tends to zero for all B ∈ (Ca − 1/2, B). The condition E(piq∗d ) > E(piq
L(p,E)
nd )
then always holds so the government chooses discipline and high bias in the entire region
corresponding to Case (iii). The shaded area in Figure 1 then extends to the vertical axis.
Paradoxically, for a given level of public pressure, a strong ability to block new policy often
leads the government to set high bias, but forcing this bias to zero will often hurt the public.
17This result takes into account condition (5), q∗ < qmax. See the appendix for more details.
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The above discussion is predicated on the assumption that p and L change so as to leave
the strength of public pressure E constant. Proposition 2 also shows what happens when
E changes. Bias can only moderate government policy if public pressure is relatively weak.
When E > B − Ca + 12 , so when p and L are sufficiently large, the government is always
disciplined by public opinion, regardless of the level of bias. Public pressure then suffices
to ensure that the government caters to the public. Thus, from the public’s point of view,
manipulations simply stack the deck in favor of implementation, which decreases their payoff.
The present model therefore suggests that the independence of government agencies should
unambiguously benefit the public in mature democracies, where E is large. In contrast,
in less mature democracies, where governments care about public opinion but are not fully
responsive to it, nonindependence may sometimes be socially optimal.
4 Secrecy
The previous section studied the case where the government must truthfully disclose both the
signal realizations and the level of bias. This section analyzes the polar opposite scenario of
secrecy : the government commits not to disclose either sq or q. The main complication that
arises is that, as in Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) and Maskin and Tirole (2004), the government
now has private information. As a result, the public’s choice will in general depend on the
policy decision of the government, which potentially conveys information.18
Despite this complication, we can characterize equilibrium play. Let R = 2θ (1− θ) and
V = θ2 + (1− θ)2. Furthermore, let σˆ = θ2+R
1+R
∈ (1
2
, 1
)
be the public’s belief that the state
is good when q = 0, implementation is selected by the government, and the government is
disciplined by public opinion.
Proposition 3. In the equilibrium of the secrecy game, the level of bias is zero. The govern-
ment selects implementation when both signals are positive and selects the status quo when
both signals are negative. Moreover, fixing the value of p ∈ (0, 1), and letting E = L/(1− p)
from (3), we have
i. If B ≤ Ca − 12 , then the government selects the status quo when the evidence is mixed
and the public accepts implementation whenever implementation is selected.
18On the other hand, the public’s choice v cannot depend on the realization of the signals sq or the bias q
because they are unobservable.
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ii. If B ∈ (Ca − 12 , Ca − 12 + E) and σˆ < Ca − cp , then the government selects imple-
mentation with probability sˇ =
(
V
2R
) σG+−Ca+ cp
Ca− cp−1/2
∈ (0, 1) when the evidence is mixed and
the public accepts implementation with probability 1 − 12−Ca+B
p( 1
2
−Ca+B)+(1−p)E ∈ (0, 1) when
implementation is selected.
iii. If B ∈ (Ca − 12 , Ca − 12 + E) and σˆ ≥ Ca − cp , then the government selects imple-
mentation when the evidence is mixed and the public accepts implementation whenever
implementation is selected.
iv. If B ≥ Ca− 12 +E and σˆ < Ca− cp , then the government selects implementation when
the evidence is mixed and the public protests implementation whenever implementation
is selected.
v. If B ≥ Ca− 12 +E and σˆ ≥ Ca− cp , then the government selects implementation when
the evidence is mixed and the public accepts implementation whenever implementation
is selected.
The equilibrium in Proposition 3 exhibits several intuitive features.19 First, consistent
with conventional wisdom, secrecy is shown to be effective at protecting the integrity of the
decision-making process. The government has no incentive to set a positive bias because
neither q nor the signal realizations are observed by the public. Increasing q simply reduces
the quality of information available to the government, so the equilibrium level of bias is zero.
A second intuitive feature of the equilibrium is that, as the government’s private benefits
B grows large, the government is less likely to be disciplined by public opinion. Proposition
3 shows that the government always selects implementation when the signals are positive,
and always selects the status quo when the signals are negative. Thus, for the government
to be disciplined by public opinion, we only need to check whether the government selects
the status quo when the signals are mixed. Proposition 3 shows that, when the signals are
mixed, implementation is always selected when B is large (cases (iv)-(v)), and it is often
selected when B is intermediate (cases (ii)-(iii)). It is only when B is small that the status
quo is always selected (case (i)). Thus, as B grows large, the government is less likely to
cater to public opinion.
19As in Proposition 1, this equilibrium is unique given our particular tie-breaking rules. Different tie-
breaking rules would only affect play in a region of parameter space (B,E) that has zero area, specifically
when B = Ca − 12 and B = Ca − 12 + E if σˆ < Ca − cp , and when σˆ = Ca − cp .
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It is also instructive to compare the equilibrium outcomes under transparency and se-
crecy (Propositions 1 and 3). More cases must be distinguished under secrecy than under
transparency (five versus three). Under secrecy, when the government selects implementa-
tion, the public cannot observe whether the signal are positive or mixed. The condition
σˆ < Ca − c/p describes scenarios where mistaken implementation is sufficiently costly for
the public to protest if implementation is selected. When mistaken implementation is less
costly (σˆ ≥ Ca − c/p), the situation is reversed. These complications do not arise under
transparency because the public can observe the signals, so that beliefs σˆ play no role.
Because public opinion is influenced by the government’s policy decision, a mixed strategy
equilibrium can arise under secrecy (case ii), which does not happen under transparency. In
this case, if the government always implements when the evidence is mixed, then the public
would always protest following implementation, by σˆ < Ca − cp . But given this protest, the
government would actually prefer to select the status quo, by B < Ca − 12 + E. Similarly, if
the government never implements when the evidence is mixed, then the public would never
protest, leading the government to prefer implementation, by B > Ca − 12 . It follows that in
equilibrium, the government and public must play mixed strategies, where the probability of
implementation after mixed evidence leaves the public indifferent about protesting following
implementation, and where the probability of protesting following implementation leaves the
government indifferent about implementing when the evidence is mixed.
Finally, from the public’s point of view, the choice between transparency and secrecy
involves a key trade-off between manipulations and discipline. Manipulations are always
(weakly) lower under secrecy, while discipline is always (weakly) higher under transparency.
That manipulations are lower under secrecy is obvious as q = 0. Let us therefore compare
transparency and secrecy in terms of discipline. When there is no conflict of interest (case
(i)), the government is disciplined by public opinion under both scenarios. In contrast,
when the conflict of interest is intermediate, the government is always disciplined by public
opinion under transparency (Proposition 1(ii)) but not under secrecy (Proposition 3(ii)-(iii)).
Furthermore, when the conflict of interest is large, the government is sometimes disciplined by
public opinion under transparency (Proposition 1(iii)) but never under secrecy (Proposition
3(iv)-(v)). Thus discipline is always at least as likely under transparency as under secrecy.
This lack of discipline under secrecy is caused by a relative lack of accountability. Without
observing the report, citizens cannot determine exactly why a particular decision was taken.
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For example, the government’s decision to select implementation could be based on strong
evidence (sG = (α, α)) or mixed evidence (sG = (α,∅)). The public would only like to
punish the government in the latter case but it cannot do so without seeing the report. As
a result, the government is less accountable and thus less responsive to public desires. It
is easy to construct examples where, because of this trade-off between manipulations and
accountability, either transparency or secrecy is preferred by the public.
5 Independence and Optimal Constitutions
So far we have assumed that the government can easily interfere with the workings of the
agency in charge of collecting information. This is a reasonable assumption if, as in the U.S.,
the President appoints and can remove the heads of the executive agencies, thus exerting
enormous influence over their policy decisions. Sometimes, however, executive influence over
government agencies is more limited. Of special interest is the case of independent agencies
such as the Federal Trade Commission in the U.S. and the Bank of England in the U.K. These
agencies are not subject to the same degree of political control as other executive agencies
and are insulated from political pressure, for instance by limiting the removal of their heads
to certain causes.
This section considers the implications of granting full independence to the government
agencies in charge of collecting information. Formally, independence is modelled as a com-
mitment not to manipulate information. Thus, an independent agency will carry out its job
as objectively as possible. We first compare transparency and secrecy under the assumption
that the agency is independent.
Proposition 4. Suppose the government agency is independent (i.e., q ≡ 0). Then the
public’s payoff is always higher under transparency than under secrecy.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: if information cannot be manipulated,
then only accountability matters, and transparency is in the interests of the public.
Having established this benchmark result, we now consider the more interesting case
where both the disclosure rule (transparency or secrecy) and the degree of insulation of
the government agency (independence or nonindependence) can be chosen to maximize the
public’s welfare. Following previous work, we refer to the stage when society decides the
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rules of the game as the ‘constitutional’ stage. The four constitutions we consider are shown
in Table I.
Table I: Constitutions
I
Transparency &
Independent Agency
II
Transparency &
Nonindependent Agency
III
Secrecy &
Independent Agency
IV
Secrecy &
Nonindependent Agency
A constitution is said to be optimal if it maximizes the public’s welfare. Proposition 5
characterizes optimal constitutions.
Proposition 5. An optimal constitution always involves transparency. The comparison be-
tween Constitution I (transparency & independent agency) and Constitution II (transparency
& nonindependent agency) is ambiguous.
In an environment where information disclosure creates incentives for manipulation, it
is perhaps surprising that transparency is always optimal. The intuition for this result is
simple: the chief advantage of secrecy – unbiased information – can more effectively be
achieved by insulating the government agency from political pressure. To see this more
formally, note that by Proposition 4, Constitution I (transparency & independent agency)
dominates Constitution III (secrecy & independent agency). Moreover, the two constitutions
involving secrecy (Constitutions III and IV) are payoff equivalent because under secrecy q is
always equal to zero in equilibrium. Thus transparency (Constitution I) always dominates
secrecy (Constitutions III and IV).20
However, this result does not imply that granting independence to government agencies
is necessarily in the public interest. Biased information can induce the government to behave
more cautiously, thus mitigating the agency conflict between the government and the public
(see Propositions 1 and 2). As a result, the comparison between Constitution I and Con-
stitution II is ambiguous. Constitution II (non-independence) can be optimal if the conflict
of interest between the government and the public is not too large, so that the benefits of
discipline outweigh the costs of the agencies’ small equilibrium bias.21
20This result requires the combination of transparency and independence to be available at the consti-
tutional stage. If independence was not feasible, the trade-off between manipulations and accountability
highlighted in the previous section would obviously reappear.
21If the conflict of interest is large (large B), then equilibrium bias can be large as well, so that Constitution
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6 Extensions
The analysis so far has focused on the polar opposite scenarios of transparency and secrecy.
Under transparency both the report and the bias in information are observable, while under
secrecy neither is observable. This section briefly discusses two intermediate scenarios, dis-
closure of the report with unobservable bias and nondisclosure of the report with observable
bias, as well as a third scenario where disclosure is voluntary. It also touches on possible
alternative assumptions about public protest. More details about the results in this section
are available from the authors upon request.
Disclosure with Unobservable Bias. We begin with the case when the report is disclosed
but the public does not observe the bias of the agency. It can be shown that if assumption (5)
holds, then the equilibrium outcome when q is unobservable is exactly the same as when q is
observable. Thus, under assumption (5), Proposition 1 is not affected by the unobservability
of q.
The idea behind this result is simple. When q is not observable, the public must form some
conjecture about the level of bias chosen by the government. In equilibrium, this conjecture
must be correct. Assumption (5) ensures that, when the public believes that q < qmax, then
the government will actually choose a level of bias q < qmax. Thus the public’s belief can
be made consistent with the play of the game. In particular, the government’s incentives to
set any q < qmax are just as in Section 3, so the same equilibrium as in Proposition 1 (with
observable q) can be supported.22
Nondisclosure with Observable Bias. An alternative scenario arises when the govern-
ment commits not to disclose the report but the agency bias is observable. This scenario is
plausible if the public is well-informed about the reputation and policy dispositions of the
individuals working for the agency, even though the report is not disclosed.
Compared to the case where bias is unobservable (secrecy), an interesting new effect can
arise. Specifically, the government may choose a strictly positive bias to commit itself to a
more congruent decision rule. Intuitively, by appointing a head of the agency who is well-
I (independence) will often be optimal. In this situation, if independence is not feasible, then the public may
actually benefit by reducing its influence on the government (reducing E) under Constitution II, sacrificing
discipline in order to eliminate all bias.
22If assumption (5) does not hold, then equilibrium behavior is more complicated and will generally involve
randomization over q.
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known to be biased in favor of implementation, the government can credibly commit not to
select implementation when the undisclosed signals are mixed. A mixed report from a very
biased bureaucrat provides very little evidence in support of implementation.
The optimal choice of q is therefore determined by two conflicting effects. On the one
hand, manipulations reduce the quality of information available to the government, which
reduces its payoff. On the other hand, a sufficiently high level of bias allows the government
to commit to a decision rule that the public prefers. This can induce the public to support
the government policy more often, thereby increasing the government payoff.
That being said, this new effect of nondisclosure with observable bias is only present if the
government needs to convince the public to support implementation. Proposition 3 shows
that the public often supports the government’s decision to implement even if the agency is
unbiased (q = 0) (see cases (i), (iii) and (v)). In this sense, these elements of Proposition 3
will continue to hold whether or not q is observable.
Voluntary Disclosure. We have assumed so far that the government must either disclose
the contents of the report or must keep it secret. More commonly, however, policymakers
have discretion as to whether to release information. We now consider a variant of the
model where the government cannot commit to any disclosure rule: disclosure is voluntary.
We argue that voluntary disclosure will effectively result in all information being disclosed.
Indeed, since information is hard in this model, Milgrom’s (1981) ‘unraveling’ result applies.
To see the logic of this result, suppose the public expects the government to disclose
favorable information (the α signals). Thus nondisclosure is interpreted as evidence that
the information is unfavorable (a ∅ signal), which provides the government with a strong
incentive to disclose favorable information. Specifically, a government that receives two
positive signals will disclose them and implement the policy with public support. When the
evidence is mixed or unfavorable, whether or not the signals are disclosed is inconsequential
because the public would realize that at least one of them is unfavorable. Thus they would
not support implementation. All information is therefore revealed, and the analysis would
proceed as in Section 3.
Alternative Assumptions about Public Protest. We have assumed that the public
protests implementation if and only if doing so increases its expected payoff. This assumption
of rationality limits the extent to which the public can influence government policy, by
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ruling out protest when the government chooses the public’s preferred action (implementing
following a positive report). If the public could commit to a punishment of magnitude B
whenever the government selected implementation, then it could resolve the agency problem
in our setting. For any bias q, interests would be fully aligned, and the government would be
disciplined by public opinion. The government would then find it optimal to set q = 0 since
the punishment it faces depends only on its actions, not on the content of the report. The
assumption of a rational public rules out such punishments, which would be highly effective,
but which are simply not credible.
Our analysis does show what occurs when the public has the strongest influence possible,
given its inability to commit to a non-credible punishment. This can either reflect a situation
where L is very large or where p is close to 1. Looking back at Figure 1, the first case
corresponds to a large value of E in Region (ii), and the second case corresponds to a situation
where E(piq
∗
d ) > E(pi
qL(p,E)
nd ) in almost all of Region (iii). Either way, the government will
be disciplined by public opinion and set q∗ > 0. This positive bias shows that the agency
problem our analysis identifies will persist. Moreover, when p is close to 1, Proposition 2
implies that forcing the bias to zero will hurt the public in a large part of Region (iii).
Our conclusions also continue to hold if the public’s decision to protest is continuous rather
than binary. Suppose that the public sets protest intensity e ∈ [0, 1], and pays increasing
and convex costs, c(e), with c(0) = c′(0) = 0. Protest then blocks implementation with
probability ep and makes the government suffer an explicit loss of eL. Our previous analysis
effectively assumes that e ∈ {0, 1} and c ≡ c(1). Allowing for continuous protest intensity
leads to only minor differences: in Proposition 1, the protest intensity under no discipline
will now be increasing in bias qL(p, E), and in the mixed strategy equilibrium of Proposition
3 (ii), the public will set some e ∈ (0, 1) with certainly to make the government indifferent
about implementation. However, all our main results will remain unchanged.
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a model where disclosure of information gives the government an incen-
tive to “fix the evidence” around its ex ante favored policy. Decision-relevant information is
collected by an agency, but the government can distort this process, for instance by staffing
the agency with biased individuals. The key trade-off the government faces is between pro-
tecting the quality of the information available for public decision making (if the agency is
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unbiased) and molding public opinion (if the agency is biased). Surprisingly, we find that
insulating the agency from political pressure, so that the agency is always unbiased, is not
necessarily in the public interest. A biased information gathering process can in fact induce
the government to act more cautiously in response to information supporting its ex ante
preferred policy. This moderating effect of bias can more than outweigh the welfare losses
caused by biased information.
We are not the first to study whether government agencies should be insulated from
external or political pressures. Moe (1989, 1990) argues that government agencies are some-
times intentionally created to be unresponsive to political pressures to alleviate the risk of
political power fluctuations. Prendergast (2003) points out that bureaucrats’ tendency to
inefficiently accede to customer demands may require appropriate organizational responses,
such as insulating government agencies from customer complaints. Betts (2004) notes that
a close connection between the President and top intelligence officials may be preferable to
the lack of such a connection because the risks of insulation and unresponsiveness often far
outweigh those of politicization. This paper highlights a novel drawback of bureaucratic in-
dependence: the risk that candid advice from government agencies may make policymakers
very responsive to information supporting their ex ante favored policy, thus exacerbating the
conflict of interest between the government and the public.
It remains an open question as to exactly which of our conclusions extend to a setting
where the government’s policy preference is private information. A government that is rel-
atively new on the political scene, facing a public unsure about the size of the conflict of
interest, may try to convey information through its policy choice. If there is no bureaucratic
independence, then it may even try to convey information through its choice of agency bias.
We would expect the main feature of our analysis, that biased information can make the
government more cautious, to apply in such a setting. There may also be additional insights
as how agency bias may help or hinder the government to credibly signal its type. We view
this as an interesting avenue for future research.
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Appendix A: Payoffs
This appendix derives explicit expressions for the government payoff and citizen welfare in
the transparency case.
The Government Payoff. The government payoff is given by
E(piq) =
∑
sG∈{α,∅}2
 ∑
sq∈{α,∅}2
pi(p(sq), v(sq)|sG) Pr(sq|sG)
Pr (sG) , (A1)
where pi(p(sq), v(sq)|sG) is the government expected payoff when the observed signals are sq
and the genuine signals are sG, and q is the probability that a genuine ∅ signal is transformed
into fake α signal.
To compute the probabilities in (A1), note that Pr ((α, α)q) = Pr((α, α)q | (α, α)G) Pr((α, α)G)+
2 Pr((α, α)q | (α,∅)G) Pr((α,∅)G) + Pr((α, α)q | (∅,∅)G) Pr((∅,∅)G) and so on. Moreover,
Pr((α, α)q | (α, α)G) = 1, Pr((α, α)q | (α,∅)G) = q, Pr((α, α)q | (∅,∅)G) = q2 and so on. Fi-
nally, Pr((α, α)G) = Pr((∅,∅)G) = 1
2
(θ2 + (1− θ)2), Pr((α,∅)G) = Pr((∅, α)G) = θ(1− θ).
Because in equilibrium Lemmas 1 and 2 must hold, we compute E(piq) under the assump-
tion that (i) the public accepts implementation if and only if both signals are positive, (ii) the
government selects implementation when both signals are positive, and (iii) the government
selects the status quo when both signals are negative. Thus, in equilibrium only two cases
can emerge: either the government is disciplined by public opinion (thus it selects the status
quo when the evidence is mixed) or the government is not disciplined by public opinion (thus
it selects implementation when the evidence is mixed).
If the government is disciplined by public opinion, then (A1) is given by
E(piqd) =
1
2
V pi(p = a, v = nd|(α, α)G) + qRpi(p = a, v = nd|(α,∅)G) + 1
2
q2V pi(p = a, v = nd|(∅,∅)G)
+ (1− q)Rpi(p = n|(α,∅)G) + q(1− q)V pi(p = n|(∅,∅)G) (A2)
+
1
2
(1− q)2V pi(p = n|(∅,∅)G),
where
V ≡ θ2 + (1− θ)2 = Pr((α, α)G) + Pr((∅,∅)G),
R ≡ 2θ(1− θ) = 2 Pr((α,∅)G),
(the subscript d stands for discipline). It is simple to see that Pr((α, α)q | (α, α)G) Pr((α, α)G) =
1
2
V , 2 Pr((α, α)q | (α,∅)G) Pr((α,∅)G) = qR, and so forth. In terms of notation, the first line
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of (A2) refers to situations where both signals are positive, the government implements,
and the public accepts. The second and third lines refer respectively to situations where
the evidence is mixed and where both signals are negative, and the government does not
implement.
By contrast, if the government is not disciplined by public opinion, then (A1) is given by
E(piqnd) =
1
2
V pi(p = a, v = nd|(α, α)G) + qRpi(p = a, v = nd|(α,∅)G) + 1
2
q2V pi(p = a, v = nd|(∅,∅)G)
+ (1− q)Rpi(p = a, v = d|(α,∅)G) + q(1− q)V pi(p = a, v = d|(∅,∅)G) (A3)
+
1
2
(1− q)2V pi(p = d|(∅,∅)G),
(the subscript nd stands for no discipline). Comparing with (A2), expression (A3) is identical
to except for its second line, which refers to situations where the evidence is mixed, the
government implements, and the public protests.
Computing the conditional payoffs pi is straightforward. For instance, pi(p = a, v =
nd|(α, α)G) = −Ca
(
1− σG+
)
+ B = −Ca(1 − θ2V ) + B, pi(p = a, v = d|(α,∅)G) = (1 −
p)(−Ca
(
1− σG)+B)+p(−CnσG)−L = (1−p)(−12Ca+B)+p(−12Cn)−L, pi(p = n|(∅,∅)G) =
−Cnσ− = − (1−θ)2V Cn and so on. Plugging these values into (A2) and (A3) yields
E(piqd) =
1
2
V
[
−Ca
(
1− θ
2
V
)
+B
]
+ qR
[
−1
2
Ca +B
]
+
1
2
q2V
[
−Ca
(
1− (1− θ)
2
V
)
+B
]
+ (1− q)R
[
−1
2
Cn
]
+ q(1− q)V
[
−(1− θ)
2
V
Cn
]
(A4)
+
1
2
(1− q)2V
[
−(1− θ)
2
V
Cn
]
,
and
E(piqnd) =
1
2
V
[
−Ca
(
1− θ
2
V
)
+B
]
+ qR
[
−1
2
Ca +B
]
+
1
2
q2V
[
−Ca
(
1− (1− θ)
2
V
)
+B
]
+ (1− q)R
[
(1− p)
(
−1
2
Ca +B
)
+ p
(
−1
2
Cn
)
− L
]
(A5)
+ q(1− q)V
[
(1− p)
(
−Ca
(
1− (1− θ)
2
V
)
+B
)
+ p
(
−(1− θ)
2
V
Cn
)
− L
]
+
1
2
(1− q)2V
[
−(1− θ)
2
V
Cn
]
.
To simplify the computations in Appendix B, it is helpful to normalize E(piqd) and E(pi
q
nd) by
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subtracting E(piGnd) from both. Since
E(piGnd) =
1
2
V
[
−Ca
(
1− θ
2
V
)
+B
]
+R
[
(1− p)
(
−1
2
Ca +B
)
+ p
(
−1
2
Cn
)
− L
]
+
1
2
V
[
−(1− θ)
2
V
Cn
]
,
(A6)
(simply set q = 0 in (A5)), we obtain
∆piqd,nd = RL−
1
2
q2V [Ca −B − σ−] + (1− p− q)R
[
Ca − 1
2
−B
]
. (A7)
∆piqnd,nd = qR
[
−p
(
Ca − 1
2
−B
)
+ L
]
−1
2
q2V [Ca −B − σ−]−(1− q) qV [(1− p)(Ca −B − σ−) + L] .
(A8)
where σ− =
(1−θ)2
V
.
Citizen Welfare. Next, we derive the public’s payoff (citizen welfare) in the transparency
case. Citizen welfare is given by
E(U q) =
∑
sG∈{α,∅}2
 ∑
sq∈{α,∅}2
U(p(sq), v(sq)|sG) Pr(sq|sG)
Pr (sG) , (A9)
where U(p(sq), v(sq)|sG) denotes the public’s payoff when the observed signals are sq and the
genuine signals are sG.
Because in equilibrium Lemmas 1 and 2 must hold, we also compute E(U q) under the
assumption that (i) the public accepts implementation if and only if both signals are positive,
(ii) the government selects implementation when both signals are positive, and (iii) the
government selects the status quo when both signals are negative. Again, two cases can
arise.
If the government is disciplined by public opinion, then (A9) becomes
E(U qd ) =
1
2
V
[
−Ca
(
1− θ
2
V
)]
+ qR
[
−1
2
Ca
]
+
1
2
q2V
[
−Ca
(
1− (1− θ)
2
V
)]
(A10)
+ (1− q)R
[
−1
2
Cn
]
+ q(1− q)V
[
−(1− θ)
2
V
Cn
]
+
1
2
(1− q)2V
[
−(1− θ)
2
V
Cn
]
,
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(as always, the subscript d stands for discipline).23 Comparing (A10) with (A4) shows that
E(U qd ) is equal to E(pi
q
d) but with the term B set to zero.
If the government is not disciplined by public opinion, then (A9) becomes
E(U qnd) =
1
2
V
[
−Ca
(
1− θ
2
V
)]
+ qR
[
−1
2
Ca
]
+
1
2
q2V
[
−Ca
(
1− (1− θ)
2
V
)]
+ (1− q)R
[
(1− p)(−1
2
Ca) + p(−1
2
Cn)− c
]
(A11)
+ q(1− q)V
[
(1− p)(−Ca
(
1− (1− θ)
2
V
)
) + p(−(1− θ)
2
V
Cn)− c
]
+
1
2
(1− q)2V
[
−(1− θ)
2
V
Cn
]
.
(the subscript nd stands for no discipline). Similarly, comparing (A11) with (A5) shows that
E(U qnd) is equal to E(pi
q
nd) but with B set to zero and L replaced by c.
We also normalize (A10) and (A11) by subtracting E(UGnd) from both. This yields
∆U qnd,nd = qR
[
−p(Ca − 1
2
) + c
]
− 1
2
q2V [Ca − σ−]− (1− q) qV [(1− p)(Ca − σ−) + c] ,
(A12)
∆U qd,nd = Rc−
1
2
q2V [Ca − σ−] + (1− p− q)R
[
Ca − 1
2
]
. (A13)
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. To prove Lemma 1, it suffices to show that setting any q > qmax is
dominated by setting q = 0. The government payoff when q = 0 is the maximum between
E(piGd ) and E(pi
G
nd). To derive the government payoff when some q > q
max is selected, we
use two facts. First, if q > qmax, then, by definition of qmax, the public always protests
implementation. Second, if sq = (∅,∅), then by Assumption 2 the government must choose
the status quo. Thus, when q > qmax, only three cases must be considered.
Case (i): the government never selects implementation. This strategy obviously yields a
lower payoff than E(piGd ). In both cases, the public never protests. In the latter case, however,
23The probabilities in (A9) have been computed above when deriving the government payoff. The payoffs
conditional on the true underlying signals are also easy to derive. For instance, U(p = a, v = nd|(α, α)G) =
−Ca
(
1− σG+
)
= −Ca(1 − θ2V ), U(p = a, v = d|(α,∅)G) = (1 − p)(−Ca
(
1− σG)) + p(−CnσG) − c = (1 −
p)(− 12Ca) + p(− 12Cn)− c, U(p = n|(∅,∅)G) = −Cnσ− = − (1−θ)
2
V Cn and so forth.
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the government selects implementation when the signals are both positive. By Assumption
1, that yields a larger payoff than selecting the status quo.
Case (ii): the government selects implementation if and only if sq = {(α, α) , (α,∅) , (∅, α)}
(no discipline). Let E(piqnd,ns) denote the government payoff in this case (the subscript ns is
used to emphasize that when q > qmax the public never supports implementation).
Fix E ≥ 0. Consider any p ∈ (0, 1), and let L = (1 − p)E, from (3). Expression (A6)
shows that E(piGnd) is linear in p and in L. Thus, E(pi
G
nd) remains linear in p after substituting
L = (1 − p)E. More generally, the government payoff, seen as a function of p, is clearly
always linear. In particular, E(piqnd,ns) is linear in p. We will show that E(pi
q
nd,ns) < E(pi
G
nd)
when evaluated at both p = 1 and p = 0. Linearity then implies E(piqnd,ns) < E(pi
G
nd) for
all p ∈ (0, 1). Since E = L/(1 − p) was fixed at an arbitrary positive value, this implies
E(piqnd,ns) < E(pi
G
nd) for all p ∈ (0, 1) and L ≥ 0
Suppose that p = 1. In this case, protest blocks implementation with probability one, so
the status quo always remains when q > qmax. At the same time, the explicit loss caused by
protest is zero, L = 0. It follows that E(piqnd,ns) takes on exactly the same value as in Case (i),
where the government never selects implementation. Thus, E(piqnd,ns) < E(pi
G
d ). Expressions
(A4) and (A5) show that E(piGd ) = E(pi
G
nd) when evaluated at p = 1 and L = 0. We conclude
that E(piqnd,ns) < E(pi
G
nd).
Suppose that p = 0. Protest then never blocks implementation, and the explicit loss
incurred by the government is L = E. Because the government selects the same policies as
in the no discipline case, E(piqnd,ns) is equal to E(pi
q
nd) evaluated at p = 0 and L = E, except
that now the public protests implementation when the signals are both positive. Thus
E(piqnd,ns) = E(pi
q
nd)−
(
1
2
V + qR +
1
2
q2V
)
E,
since Pr((α, α)q) = 1
2
V + qR + 1
2
q2V . Using (A8), simple algebra yields
E(piqnd,ns)−E(piGnd) = −
1
2
V E− 1
2
q2V [Ca −B + E − σ−]−(1− q) qV [Ca −B + E − σ−] < 0,
where Ca −B + E − σ− > 0 by Assumption 2. It follows that E(piqnd,ns) < E(piGnd).
Case (iii): the government selects implementation if and only if sq = (α, α) (discipline).
Let E(piqd,ns) denote the government payoff in this case.
Suppose p = 1. As in Case (ii), the status quo always remains when q > qmax. The same
logic as above then implies E(piqd,ns) < E(pi
G
d ) = E(pi
G
d ).
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Now suppose p = 0, so that protest never blocks implementation, and L = E. E(piqd,ns)
is equal to E(piqd) except that now the public protests implementation when the signals are
both positive. Thus
E(piqd,ns) = E(pi
q
d)−
(
1
2
V + qR +
1
2
q2V
)
E.
Using (A4), and (A7), simple algebra yields
E(piqd,ns)− E(piGnd) = −
1
2
V E − 1
2
q2V [Ca −B + E − σ−] + (1− q)R
[
Ca −B + E − 1
2
]
,
and
E(piqd,ns)− E(piGd ) = −
1
2
V E − 1
2
q2V [Ca −B + E − σ−]− qR
[
Ca −B + E − 1
2
]
.
Again, Ca−B+E−σ− > 0 by Assumption 2. Thus, regardless of the sign of
[
Ca −B + E − 12
]
,
we have either E(piqd,ns) < E(pi
G
nd), or E(pi
q
d,ns) < E(pi
G
d ), or both. Linearity of the government
payoff with respect to p then implies that either E(piqd,ns) < E(pi
G
nd), or E(pi
q
d,ns) < E(pi
G
d ), or
both, for all p ∈ (0, 1). 
To prove Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, the following lemma is useful.
Lemma B1. Suppose the government and the public share the same beliefs about the true
state: σGov = σP . Then, if the public will accept implementation, and c/p < B, then the
government will select implementation. If the public will protest implementation, then the
government will select implementation when σGov ≥ Ca −B + E.
Proof of Lemma B1. Let σGov = σP = σ. Recall that the public accepts implementation
if σ ≥ Ca − c/p. Assuming that the public accepts, the government selects implementation
if σ ≥ Ca −B. This latter condition is implied by σ ≥ Ca − c/p whenever c/p < B. Thus, if
the public supports implementation, then the government also selects implementation. The
second part of the lemma follows immediately from (2) and (3). 
Proof of Lemma 2. From Assumption 1 and the fact that q ≤ qmax, it follows immediately
that the public accepts implementation if and only if both signals are positive. Assumption 2
implies that the government selects the status quo when both signals are negative. Because
the public accepts implementation when both signals are positive, it also follows from Lemma
B1 that the government must select implementation in that case if c/p ≤ B.
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It remains to show that the government also selects implementation when both signals are
positive if c/p ≤ B. Suppose the status quo was optimal. Then it must be that σq+ < Ca−B.
This would imply σq < Ca − B, so the government would always choose the status quo.
But the government could then earn strictly higher profits E(piGd ) by setting q = 0 and
selecting implementation after two positive signals s shown in the proof of Lemma 1, which
is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 1. From Lemma 2, the government selects implementation in equi-
librium when both signals are positive and the status quo when both signals are negative.
Moreover, the public accepts implementation if and only if both signals are positive. It only
remains to be shown is whether the government selects implementation or the status quo
when the evidence is mixed.
Fix the value of p ∈ (0, 1), and let E = L/(1− p) from (3). Suppose that B < Ca− 12 +E
(cases (i) and (ii)). Recall that σq = Pr(A|(α,∅)q) ≤ 1
2
. Because σq ≤ 1
2
< Ca − B + E,
Lemma B1 implies that for all q’s the government selects the status quo when the evidence is
mixed. Thus, if B < Ca − 12 + E, for all q’s the government is disciplined by public opinion.
Next, we derive the optimal q when B < Ca − 12 + E (cases (i) and (ii)). Recall that
E(piqd) denotes the government payoff when the government is disciplined by public opinion
and the size of the bias is q. Define
∆piqd,nd ≡ E(piqd)− E(piGnd), where q ∈ [0, qmax] ,
The optimal q solves
max
q∈[0,qmax]
E(piqd),
or equivalently
max
q∈[0,qmax]
∆piqd,nd,
since E(piGnd) is independent of q. Thus the equilibrium level of bias is q
∗ = arg maxq∈[0,qmax]E(pi
q
d).
From (A7) in Appendix A, we have
∆piqd,nd = RL−
1
2
q2V [Ca −B − σ−] + (1− p− q)R
[
Ca − 1
2
−B
]
.
Assumption 2 implies Ca −B − σ− > 0. Thus simple algebra yields
q∗ =
{
R
V
1/2−Ca+B
Ca−B−σ− if B ∈ (Ca − 12 , Ca − 12 + E)
0 if B ≤ Ca − 12
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The government indeed finds it optimal select implementation after two positive signals when
q = q∗, so σq
∗
> Ca − B. If that were not the case, then the government would never select
implementation. By Assumption 2, it could then earn strictly higher profits E(piGd ) by setting
q = 0 and implementing after two positive signals, contradicting the fact that q∗ > 0 was
optimal.
Note that given condition (5), we restrict attention to parameter values for which the
constraint q ≤ qmax does not bind. Using the above formula for q∗, and the fact that
Ca − c/p = σqmax+ , we can rewrite condition (5) more explicitly as
R
V
1/2− Ca +B
Ca −B − σ−︸ ︷︷ ︸
q∗
<
−R
V
(
Ca − cp − 1/2
)
+
√(
R
V
)2 (
Ca − cp − 1/2
)2
−
(
Ca − cp − σ−
)(
Ca− c
p
− σG+
)
(
Ca − cp − σ−
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
qmax
.
(B1)
Define B1 ∈ (Ca− 12 , Ca−σ−) such that (B1) holds strictly if and only if B < B1. Hence there
exist values of B ∈ (Ca − 12 , Ca − 12 + E) that satisfy condition (5). (If instead B ≤ Ca − 12 ,
then q∗ = 0 and assumption (5) always holds.) This proves parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition
1.
To prove part (iii), let B ≥ Ca − 12 + E. Two cases can arise, depending on whether q
is above or below the threshold qˆ, defined as the solution to σq = Ca − B + E. Recall that
σq =
R
2
+q(1−θ)2
R+qV
. Then
qˆ =
R
(
1
2
− Ca +B − E
)
V (Ca −B + E)− (1− θ)2 =
R
V
1/2− Ca +B − E
Ca −B + E − σ− . (B2)
The requirement that B ≥ Ca − 12 + E implies qˆ ≥ 0, and E > 0 implies qˆ < q∗ < qmax .
When q < qˆ, it is optimal for the government to select implementation when the signals
are mixed, because q < qˆ implies σq > Ca−B+E (see Lemma B1). Conversely, when q > qˆ,
it is optimal for the government to selects the status quo. Thus, when B ≥ Ca − 12 + E, the
normalized government payoff is
∆piqLB ≡
{
∆piqnd,nd = E(pi
q
nd)− E(piGnd) if q ∈ [0, qˆ]
∆piqd,nd = E(pi
q
d)− E(piGnd) if q ∈ (qˆ, qmax]
,
The optimal q solves
max
q∈[0,qmax]
∆piqLB.
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By the definition of qˆ, we have ∆piqnd,nd = ∆pi
q
d,nd when evaluated at q = qˆ. Looking at (A7)
and (A8) then confirms that ∆piqLB is continuous on [0, q
max], since ∆piqnd,nd and ∆pi
q
d,nd are
both continuous in q on their respective domains.
From (A7), ∆piqd,nd is strictly concave in q, with
∂2∆piqd,nd
∂q2
= −V (Ca −B − σ−) < 0,
and achieves its maximum at q∗ = R
V
1/2−(Ca−B)
Ca−B−σ− > qˆ. It follows that the government maximizes
∆piqLB either by choosing discipline and q = q
∗, or by choosing no discipline and some qL ≤
qˆ < q∗. The statement of Proposition 1 uses the notation qL(p, E) to emphasize the fact that
the value of qL may depend on both p and L, or equivalently on p and E.
We now show that given L = (1− p)E, we have qL = 0 whenever p ≤ 1/2. Substituting
L = (1− p)E into (A8) and differentiating twice with respect to q yields
∂2∆piqnd,nd
∂q2
= −V (Ca −B − σ−) + 2V [(1− p)(Ca −B − σ− + E)] .
It follows that ∆piqd,nd is strictly convex if
p < 1− 1
2
(
Ca −B − σ−
Ca −B − σ− + E
)
. (7)
Thus, when p ≤ 1/2, arg maxq∈[0,qˆ] ∆piqnd,nd is either 0 or qˆ. However, qˆ yields a lower payoff
than q∗ since ∆piqˆnd,nd = ∆pi
qˆ
d,nd < ∆pi
q∗
d,nd, by q
∗ > qˆ. Thus, on [0, qmax], the optimal q is
either 0 or q∗, depending on whether E(pi0nd) ≶ E(pi
q∗
d ) (or, equivalently, ∆pi
0
nd,nd ≶ ∆pi
q∗
d,nd).
Finally, since B1 > Ca − 1/2, there exist values of B > Ca − 1/2 + E that satisfy condition
(5), provided that E is sufficiently small. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose first that B ≤ Ca − 12 . Then by Proposition 1(i),
the equilibrium level of bias is zero. Imposing q = 0 therefore leaves the public’s payoff
unchanged.
Suppose instead that B ∈ (Ca− 12 , Ca− 12 +E). Then by Proposition 1(ii), the government
is disciplined by public opinion and the equilibrium level of bias is q∗ = R
V
1/2−Ca+B
Ca−B−σ− . Substi-
tuting L = (1 − p)E into (A7) and imposing q = 0, the government will remain disciplined
by public opinion since
∆piGd,nd = E(pi
G
d )− E(piGnd) = R(1− p)
(
Ca −B + E − 1
2
)
> 0.
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Let E(U qd ) denote the public’s payoff under discipline with bias q, given by (A10). We have
∆U qd,d ≡ E(U qd )− E(UGd ) = −qR
(
Ca − 1
2
)
− 1
2
q2V (Ca − σ−) ,
which is decreasing in q. Hence imposing q = 0 when B ∈ (Ca − 12 , Ca − 12 + E) will strictly
increase the public’s payoff.
Now suppose that B ≥ Ca − 12 + E. Proposition 1(iii) then implies that for E(piq
∗
d ) ≤
E(pi
qL(p,E)
nd ), the government chooses no discipline, and the equilibrium level of bias is q
L(p, E).
Since 0 ≤ qL(p, E) ≤ qˆ, the government continues to choose no discipline when q = 0.
Let ∆U qnd,nd = E(U
q
nd)−E(UGnd) denote the normalized public payoff under no discipline,
given by (A12). Differentiating (A12) with respect to q and rearranging yields
∂∆U qnd,nd
∂q
= −R
[
p(Ca − 1
2
)− c
]
− 2qV [p(Ca − σ−)− c]− V [(1− p)(Ca − σ−) + c] ,
which is strictly negative by Assumption 1 and σ− < σG = 1/2. It follows that when
E(piq
∗
d ) ≤ E(piq
L(p,E)
nd ), imposing q = 0 will strictly increase the public’s payoff if q
L(p, E) > 0,
and leave the public’s payoff unchanged if qL(p, E) = 0.
If instead E(piq
∗
d ) > E(pi
qL(p,E)
nd ), then the government is disciplined by public opinion and
the equilibrium level of bias is q∗. Moreover, substituting L = (1 − p)E into (A7), B ≥
Ca − 12 + E implies ∆piGd,nd ≤ 0 . Hence imposing q = 0 leaves the government undisciplined
by public opinion. By (A13), this will strictly decrease the public’s payoff if
∆U q
∗
d,nd = Rc−
1
2
q∗2V (Ca − σ−) + (1− q∗ − p)R
(
Ca − 1
2
)
> 0.
Direct substitution yields ∆UGd,nd > 0 and ∆U
1
d,nd < 0, where ∆U
q∗
d,nd is continuous and
decreasing in q∗. Moreover, q∗ = R
V
1/2−Ca+B
Ca−B−σ− is continuous and increasing in B, with q
∗ = 0
when evaluated at B = Ca− 12 . Define B2 > Ca − 12 as the value of B for which ∆U q
∗
d,nd = 0,
where ∆U q
∗
d,nd > 0 if and only if B < B2. Moreover, define B = min(B1, B2), where (B1)
holds strictly if and only if B < B1. It follows that, over the parameter region for which
condition (5) does not bind, imposing q = 0 will strictly decrease the public’s payoff if and
only if both B ∈ [Ca − 12 + E,B) and E(piq
∗
d,nd) > E(pi
qL(p,E)
d,nd ).
First suppose that p is sufficiently small so that (7) holds (in particular this is the case
for all p ∈ (0, 1/2]. Then Proposition 1 implies qL(p, E) = 0, so that E(piq∗d ) > E(piq
L(p,E)
nd ) is
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equivalent to
∆piq
∗
d,nd = R(1− p)E −
1
2
q∗2V [Ca −B − σ−] + (1− q∗ − p)R
[
Ca − 1
2
−B
]
> 0,
using (A7) and L = (1 − p)E. Fix B > Ca − 12 . Note that q∗ = RV 1/2−Ca+BCa−B−σ− is independent
of E, ∆piq
∗
d,nd is continuous and strictly increasing in E for all p < 1, and ∆pi
q∗
d,nd < 0 when
evaluated at E = 0. Define E(B, p) as the value of E for which ∆piq
∗
d,nd = 0:
E(B, p) =
1
2
q∗2V [Ca −B − σ−] + (1− q∗ − p)R
[
B − Ca + 12
]
R(1− p) , (8)
so that ∆piq
∗
d,nd ≤ 0 for all E ≤ E(B), and ∆piq
∗
d,nd > 0 for all (E(B), B−Ca+ 12 ] . To show that
E(B, p) < B −Ca + 12 , notice that E(B) is decreasing in q∗ over the interval [0, RV 1/2−Ca+BCa−B−σ− ],
and E(B, p) = B − Ca + 12 when evaluated at q∗ = 0. Differentiating (8) with respect to p
simplifying shows that
∂E(B, p)
∂p
=
−q∗
2R(1− p)2
(
1
2
− Ca −B
)
< 0.
Now suppose that p ≥ 1/2 is sufficiently large to violate (7). We showed above that E(piGnd) >
E(piq
∗
d ) when E = 0. The optimality of q
L(p, E) implies E(pi
qL(p,E=0)
nd ) ≥ E(piGnd), so it follows
that E(pi
qL(p,E=0)
nd ) > E(pi
q∗
d ).
(A4) shows that E(piqd) is independent of p and E. Using L = (1− p)E, (A5) shows that
∂
∂E
E(piqnd) < 0 for all q < 1, and also that B > Ca − 12 + E implies ∂∂pE(piqnd) < 0. Moreover,
d
dE
E(pi
qL(p,E)
nd ) =
∂
∂E
E(pi
ql(p,E)
nd ), and
d
dp
E(pi
qL(p,E)
nd ) =
∂
∂p
E(pi
ql(p,E)
nd ), by the envelope theorem
and the optimality of qL(p, E), since ∂
∂q
E(piqnd) = 0 when evaluated at q
L(p, E). It follows
that E(pi
qL(p,E)
nd ) is decreasing in E and p.
Define E(B, p) as the value of E for which E(pi
qL(p,E)
nd ) = E(pi
q∗
d ). We showed above
that there exists such a E(B, p) for any p sufficiently small to satisfy (7), with E(B, p) <
B − Ca + 1/2. Thus, by ddEE(piq
L(p,E)
d ) and
d
dp
E(pi
qL(p,E)
d ), there must also exist such a
E(B, p) < B − Ca + 1/2 for any p sufficiently large to violate (7), with ∂∂pE(B, p) < 0.
Now fix E ∈ (0, B − Ca + 12), and let p tend to 1. From (A8), taking the first order
condition for E(piqnd) with respect to q yields the optimal bias under no discipline
qL(p, E) =
R
[
p(1
2
− Ca +B) + (1− p)E
]− V [(1− p)(Ca −B − σ− + E)]
V [(Ca −B − σ−)− 2(1− p)(Ca −B − σ− + E)] , (9)
so that in the limit qL(p, E) tends to q∗. The proof of Proposition 1 showed that q∗ > qˆ,
given by (B2), for any E > 0. Hence, by the definition of qˆ, q∗ > qˆ implies E(piq
∗
nd) < E(pi
q∗
d ),
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which in turn yields E(pi
qL(p,E)
nd ) < E(pi
q∗
d ). This is the case for any fixed E ∈ (0, 1), so it
follows that limp→1E(B, p) = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Standard results in decision theory imply that, for any given
belief about q that the public may hold, setting q = 0 is a weakly dominant strategy for the
government (see Marschak and Radner, 1972, pp. 65-67. Further details are available from
the authors upon request). It follows that the equilibrium bias is q = 0. Notice also that
when both signals are negative, the government selects the status quo since Ca−B > σ− by
Assumption 2.
For case (i), the government has a dominant strategy to select the status quo when the
evidence is mixed. If the public does not protest, then the government earns −Ca/2 + B
from implementation and −Cn/2 from the status quo, where the status quo is optimal by
B ≤ Ca − 1/2. This in turn implies Ca −B − 1/2 +E ≥ 0, so the status quo is also optimal
if the public were to protest implementation. The public therefore believes σp = σ
G
+ upon
observing implementation. It implementation because Ca − c/p ≤ σG+ by Assumption 1.
For cases (iv) and (v), the government has a dominant strategy to select implementation
when the evidence is mixed. Say the evidence is mixed. If the public protests, then the
government earns (1−p)(−Ca/2+B)+p(−Cn/2)−L from implementation and −Cn/2 from
the status quo, where implementation is optimal by B ≥ Ca− 1/2 +E. This in turn implies
B ≥ Ca−1/2, so implementation is also optimal if there public were to accept it. The public
therefore believes the probability of the good state conditional on observing implementation
is
[1− (1− θ)2]
[1− (1− θ)2] + 1− θ2 =
θ2 +R
1 +R
≡ σˆ.
Given beliefs σp = σˆ, the public earns (1 − σˆ)(−Ca) from accepting implementation and
(1 − p)(1 − σˆ)(−Ca) + pσˆ(−Cn) − c from protesting. It follows that the public will accept
implementation if and only if σˆ ≥ Ca − c/p.
For case (iii), if σˆ ≥ Ca−c/p, then the public will accept implementation. The government
therefore earns −Ca/2 + B from implementation and −Cn/2 from the status quo when the
evidence is mixed. It follows that implementation is optimal because B > Ca − 1/2.
For case (ii), we have B ∈ (Ca − 12 , Ca − 12 + E) and σˆ < Ca. Suppose the government
always selects implementation when the evidence is mixed. Then the public will protest
implementation since σˆ < Ca. But then the government could profitably deviate to the
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status quo when the evidence is mixed, since B < Ca − 12 + E, in contrast to cases (iv) and
(v).
Suppose instead the government always selects the status quo when the evidence is mixed.
Then the public will accept implementation since σG+ ≥ Ca− c/p by Assumption 1. But then
the government could profitably deviate to implementation when the evidence is mixed since
B > Ca − 12 . It follows that any equilibrium must be in mixed strategies.
Let zˇ denote the probability that the public protests conditional on observing implemen-
tation, and let sˇ denote the probability that the government selects implementation when
the evidence is mixed. The indifference condition for the government is
−Cn
2
= (1− zˇ)
[−Ca
2
+B
]
+ zˇ
[
(1− p)(−Ca
2
+B) + p(
−Cn
2
)− L
]
,
=⇒ zˇ =
1
2
− Ca +B
p(1
2
− Ca +B) + (1− p)E .
The indifference condition for the public is Pr(A | a, sˇ) = Ca − c/p, where Pr(A | a, sˇ)
is the public’s belief that the state is good, S = A, when the government selects implemen-
tation (p = a), given that the government implements with probability one if (α, α)G, with
probability sˇ if the evidence is mixed, and with probability zero if (∅,∅)G. Using Bayes’
rule
Pr(A | a, sˇ) = θ
2 + sˇR
V + 2sˇR
= Ca − c
p
=⇒ sˇ = θ
2 − (Ca − cp)V
R
(
2(Ca − cp)− 1
) = ( V
2R
)
σG+ − Ca + cp
Ca − cp − 1/2
.
It is easy to show that σˆ < Ca− c/p implies sˇ < 1 and that B ∈ (Ca− 12 , Ca− 12 +E) implies
zˇ < 1.
To complete the proof, notice that the government selects implementation with positive
probability for all cases (i)-(v), when the evidence is mixed. Thus, implementation is always
a best response when the evidence is mixed, given the strategy of public. It follows that
implementation is also a best response when both signals are positive, by σG+ > σ
G = 1/2, so
that in equilibrium the government will select implementation after a positive report. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Obvious. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Note that Constitutions III and IV yield the same citizen welfare
since nondisclosure implies q = 0 in equilibrium (Proposition 3). Moreover, by Proposition 4
Constitution I dominates Constitution III (and hence also Constitution IV). Thus disclosure
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is always a feature of an optimal constitution. Finally, Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate
that either Constitution I or II can be optimal. 
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